

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
Outside System

State Dept., NSC, review completed

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

January 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Message from  
Ambassador Byroade

Ambassador Byroade has sent you a [ ] message (Tab B) regarding conversations he recently had with Prime Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed on the question of security assistance for Pakistan. Bhutto and Ahmed emphasized Pakistan's need for increased US military assistance and told Byroade that their understanding of President Nixon's and Secretary Kissinger's position was that the US would "try to find a way."

25.25X1

Byroade points out that Bhutto and Ahmed may be intentionally exaggerating what the President and the Secretary have told them on this issue. My own understanding of what the President and the Secretary have said to the Pakistanis is that US Congressional attitudes make it very difficult for us to ease our present restrictions on US military assistance to Pakistan, but that we sympathize with Pakistan's situation and are urging third countries--particularly Iran and China--to be as helpful as possible.

Byroade says he can wait for a clarification of our position until he has a chance to talk to the Secretary personally. Therefore, no more than a brief acknowledgement from you seems necessary, although a sentence could be added on substance if you thought that desirable. A suggested reply is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the reply at Tab A to Ambassador Byroade.

Approve

*as indicated*

Disapprove

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

MORI C05075240

*sent 1/5/73 RCM*  
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

SECRET (XGDS)

25X1X1

TO: Islamabad - Ambassador Byroade

FROM: White House - General Scowcroft

Thank you for your message on your talks with Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed on the question of security assistance. I know the Secretary will want to talk to you about this issue the next time you are in Washington.

*It is a tough problem and we have not yet found a solution likely to bring joy to Pak hearts.*

*Warm regards.*

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Bud -  
Hal should see this  
and I at least need to  
acknowledge. Burt

Send to Records 12/9 RCM

Tab B

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S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

ROUTINE

25X1

R 181200Z DEC 73  
FM ISLAMABAD

TO WHITE HOUSE

25X1X1

S E C R E T 181200Z DEC 73

FROM AMBASSADOR BYROADE ISLAMABAD 1144  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR BRENT SCOCROFF

1. HOPE YOU HAVE HAD TIME TO READ AT LEAST PORTIONS OF AMERICAN EMBASSY ISLAMABAD 10803 ON MY TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED AND CAN READ IN ENTIRETY AMERICAN EMBASSY ISLAMABAD 10832 (WITH MY APOLOGIES FOR ITS LENGTH) ON MY FIRST SERIOUS TALK WITH BHUTTO. WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I DELIBERATELY TONED DOWN REMARKS OF BOTH OF THEM WHEREIN THEY QUOTED THE PRESIDENT AND KISSINGER. AS REGARDS THE FORMER, THEY SAID THAT THEY BELIEVED, ON THE ALL IMPORTANT QUESTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, THAT THE POSITION OF OUR PRESIDENT WAS "WE WILL TRY TO FIND A WAY". ALSO, THEY EQUATE TO KISSINGER APPROXIMATELY THE SAME POSITION. BHUTTO SAID THAT HE DID NOT PRESS KISSINGER ON HIS LAST TRIP THROUGH HERE IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S EXTRAORDINARY SCHEDULE AND THE BURDENS UPON HIM. HE EPID, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE KISSINGER COULD HAVE PERHAPS SIMPLIFIED HIS PROBLEMS BY JUST SAYING "NO", HE HAD NOT DONE SO, MERELY ASKING BHUTTO TO WAIT UNTIL HE COULD EMERGE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND HAVE MORE TIME ON THE PROBLEM.

*Copies of 1  
two cables  
attached.*

2. I AM AWARE THAT THEY MAY BE EXAGGERATING IN THEIR OWN BEHALF. THEY MAY ALSO BE TRYING TO JUDGE ME BY TRYING TO FIND OUT JUST HOW MUCH I KNOW OF RECENT INTIMATE TALKS. THEY MAY ALSO HOPE I WILL START OFF HERE ACCEPTING THEIR VERSION IF I DO NOT REALLY KNOW. IT MAY OF COURSE ALSO BE THAT OUR SUPERIORS DID NOT WANT TO SIMPLY SAY "NO" AND WERE MAKING NOTHING MORE THAN DIPLOMATIC STALL IN VIEW OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM.

3. I REALIZE IT WOULD BE ASKING TOO MUCH TO GET CLARIFICATION THROUGH ANY CHANNEL OR CLASSIFICATION, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS I CAN GET HOME AND PERSONALLY SEE THE SECRETARY. IN THE MEANTIME, JUST WANTED YOU TO KNOW, AND WILL PLAY BY EAR HERE TRYING TO MAKE UP MY OWN MIND AS TO JUST WHAT WE SHOULD DO, OR NOT DO. REGARDS.

E2 IMPDET  
300

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE

PSN:012475

PAGE 01

OF 01

TDR:352/13:31Z

DTG:181200Z DEC 73



## Department of State

TELEGRAM

DEC 15 1973

SECRET 948

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10832 01 OF 04 1521432

72

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

014173

P R 151406Z DEC 73  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2492  
 INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 CINCPAC

D/B (7)

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
 HOLBRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
 HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
 JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
 KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
 NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
 ODELL \_\_\_\_\_  
 KATLIFE \_\_\_\_\_  
 RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
 SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SOMMERFELD \_\_\_\_\_  
 V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
 WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

R

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 10832

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY ON HIS RETURN

E.O. 11652: GDS  
 TAGS: PFOR, MASS, PK, US  
 SUBJ: BHUTTO AND U.S. ARMS POLICY

1. MINISTER OF LAW AND EDUCATION PKIRZADA ASKED THAT I CALL ON HIM LAST NIGHT (DECEMBER 14) AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WE HAD A PLEASANT TALK FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF THAT HAD EVERY APPEARANCE OF BEING A PRELIMINARY FOR A SERIOUS TALK WITH BHUTTO. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE THE CASE, AS EARLY THIS MORNING I WAS ASKED TO MEET WITH BHUTTO AT NOON FOR A TALK THAT LASTED SOMEWHAT OVER AN HOUR. IT WAS A VERY WIDE-RANGING TALK WHICH I WILL REPORT IN SOME DETAIL AS IT WILL PORTRAY THE BACKGROUND AS TO HOW WE STARTED OUT ON THE ALL IMPORTANT ISSUE OF SECURITY AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FROM WHICH I AM SURE MANY OTHER, BUT MUCH SHORTER, CABLES WILL LATER EMERGE. REFERENCES TO HISTORY WILL NOT BE REPORTED IN DETAIL IN THE FUTURE BUT ARE INCLUDED HEREIN PARTLY BECAUSE, TO USE THE SECRETARY'S OWN WORDS, "OUR INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY IS SO SHORT."

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## Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10832 01 OF 04 102143Z

2. BHUTTO ASKED HOW I WAS GETTING ON AND I JOKINGLY TOLD HIM THAT I HAD BEEN HELPING WORK ON A COMPUTER THAT COULD HELP US DETERMINE OUR TRUE FRIENDS WHICH HE HAD RECENTLY REFERRED TO IN ABU DHABI, (ABU DHABI 1631). I THANKED HIM FOR THIS DISPLAY OF FRIENDSHIP FOR US. HE SAID HE HAD IN FACT DONE SO IN EACH OF HIS STOPS IN THAT AREA, ALTHOUGH THIS IS THE ONLY ONE THAT CAME DIRECTLY TO OUR ATTENTION. HE SAID THAT KISSINGER HAD ASKED THAT HE DO WHAT HE COULD TO HELP OUR POSITION IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD AND HE HAD BEEN VERY GLAD TO COMPLY IN EACH OF HIS STOPS. HE SAID THAT WHILE REACTIONS HAD NOT BEEN IDENTICAL IN EACH CASE, ALL HAD CERTAINLY BEEN SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE IDEA OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND SEEMED WILLING TO WORK IN THAT DIRECTION. I THANKED HIM AGAIN AND SAID THAT I WAS SURE WASHINGTON WOULD CERTAINLY SHARE MY OWN APPRECIATION OF THESE GOOD EFFORTS IN OUR BEHALF.

3. BHUTTO THEN REFERRED TO MY RECENT TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED ON THE SUBJECT OF PROJECT "PEACE INDIGO" IN INDIA (ISLAMABAD 10803). HE SAID HE HAD ASKED AZIZ AHMED TO SEE ME ON THIS AS THE NEWSPAPER REPORT HERE HAD CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ABOUT OUR CURRENT POLICIES, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE MILITARY. I SAID I REGRETTED THE FACT THAT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TALK ABOUT IT PRIOR TO THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION, BUT SAID OUR SEARCH OF THE FILES HAD INDICATED THAT WE HAD GONE THROUGH THE PROJECT COMPLETELY WITH AZIZ AHMED ALMOST EXACTLY A YEAR AGO, AND IN RESPONSE TO THIS OWN REMARK HAD INDICATED THAT WE THOUGHT IT A FAIR ASSUMPTION THAT THE PROJECT WOULD PROCEED IF TOTAL EMBARGO WERE LIFTED. HE SAID HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS NOT TOO CONCERNED OVER THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT, BUT THAT HE WAS GREATLY CONCERNED ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF SECURITY. HE SAID THAT ON HIS RECENT STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTON HE HAD NOT PRESSED THIS SUBJECT AS HARD AS HIS OWN CONSCIENCE TOLD HIM TO DO, AND AS OTHERS IN HIS GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WANTED HIM TO DO. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT THIS WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR US AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNKIND OF HIM TO TRY TO MAKE A REAL ISSUE OF IT

SECRET

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10832 01 OF 04 152143Z

WITH ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS BEING FACED BY OUR WHITE HOUSE AT THE TIME, THE MOOD OF THE CONGRESS, ETC. NOR, HE SAID, DID HE PRESS KISSINGER AS HARD AS HE WANTED TO ON HIS LAST TRIP THROUGH HERE, AS HE REALIZED THE VERY GREAT BURDEN HE WAS CARRYING ON HIS SHOULDERS ON OTHER MATTERS OF EXTREME URGENCY AND IMPORTANCE. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT HE AND I COULD ADDRESS THE PROBLEM ANEW AND TRY TO GET TOGETHER IN OUR THINKING. I TOLD HIM I WAS EAGER TO HAVE HIS VIEWS IN ANY DETAIL HE WISHED. I SAID I WAS OF COURSE HERE TO CARRY OUT PRESENT U.S. POLICY AS DETERMINED BY OUR PRESIDENT TO THE VERY BEST OF MY ABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I WOULD ALWAYS BE WILLING TO HEAR AND WEIGH CAREFULLY HIS OWN VIEWS ON THESE POLICIES, AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE IMPROVED UPON WHEN POSSIBLE.

4. BHUTTO SAID THAT THE DISPARITY OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REGION WAS BECOMING TOO GREAT TO BE SAFELY LIVED WITH. HE MENTIONED FIRST THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO DELHI AND SAID THEY HAD INFORMATION, OF WHICH HE WAS NOT YET COMPLETELY CERTAIN, THAT SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT WOULD FLOW TO INDIA FROM THOSE MEETINGS. HE SAID THAT INDIA NOW SEEMED EAGER TO RESTORE PEACE WITH CHINA, SO THERE SEEMED TO BE NO OTHER NATION THAT INDIA HAD IN MIND IN INCREASING HER ARMAMENTS THAN PAKISTAN. HE SAID THEY ALSO FELT, IN SPITE OF PUBLIC ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME SOVIET-INDIAN UNDERSTANDING ON THE PROPOSED AREA COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD TWO REPORTS. ONE WAS THAT INDIA HAD AGREED TO JOIN SUCH A PACT AFTER RELATIONS WITH CHINA HAD BEEN RESTORED TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. THE OTHER REPORT WAS THAT INDIA HAD AGREED TO LOBBYING FOR THE IDEA AMONG OTHER NATIONS AND TO GO AHEAD AND JOIN AFTER OTHERS HAD BEEN RECRUITED. THE REPORT WAS THAT JAPAN AND INDONESIA WOULD BE THE FIRST TO BE APPROACHED. HE SAID ADAM MALIK HAD TOLD HIM SOMETIME AGO OF HIS OWN SURPRISE WHEN THE INDIANS TALKED TO HIM FAVORABLY ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE PACT.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 949

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10832 02 OF 04 152112Z

02  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

014111

P R 151406Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2403  
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 10832

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY ON HIS RETURN

5. I TOLD HIM I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON SOME OF HIS REMARKS AND THEN GET MORE INTO THE SECURITY QUESTION. I SAID OUR INTERPRETATION SO FAR WAS A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT AS REGARDS THE BREZHNEV VISIT, ADMITTING THAT, OF COURSE, WE COULD NOT BE SURE. WE DID NOT KNOW AS YET WHETHER ANY INCREASED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INDIA WAS AGREED UPON. WE KNEW THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION HAD BEEN STRESSED, BUT AGAIN DO NOT KNOW EXACT NATURE OF ANY AGREEMENTS. ON THE SAIAN SECURITY PACT WE WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT INDIA MADE IT CLEAR PRIVATELY THAT SHE DID NOT WANT AT THIS TIME TO GET INVOLVED, AND WAS STRONG ON THIS TO THE POINT WHERE BREZHNEV DID NOT MAKE A PUBLIC PITCH FOR IT WHICH HAD BEEN EXPECTED. WE WERE OF COURSE WATCHING ALL THIS CLOSELY TO SEE WHAT WILL FOLLOW.

6. AS REGARDS HIS GENERAL PROBLEM OF SECURITY AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, I SMILINGLY SAID THAT I OFTEN WONDERED WHY I DID NOT HAVE MORE SENSE THAN TO WILLINGLY WALK BACK INTO THIS PROBLEM AGAIN. I TOLD HIM I HAD BEEN

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SECRET

47





## Department of State

TELEGRAM


SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10832 02 OF 04 152112Z

DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THIS AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST DECISION THAT AMERICA WOULD SUPPLY EQUIPMENT WHICH WAS IN THE EARLY 50'S. I SAID AS I KNEW THAT HE AND I DURING MY TOUR HERE WOULD SPEND A LOT OF TIME ON THIS SUBJECT, IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT WE MIGHT START OFF KNOWING EACH OTHER BETTER, AND ACTUALLY UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S PROBLEMS BETTER, IF WE SPENT A FEW MINUTES IN THIS FIRST TALK ON SOME OF ITS HISTORY. HE SAID THAT WAS AN IDEAL WAY TO BEGIN AND URGED THAT I GO AHEAD.

7. I TOLD HIM THAT IN THE EARLY 50'S OUR PENTAGON INVITED THEN CHIEF OF STAFF AYUB KHAN TO VISIT THE U.S. TO TOUR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. AS I WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THIS AREA AT THE TIME, AND PERHAPS BECAUSE WE KNEW EACH OTHER PERSONALLY QUITE WELL, HE CAME ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO MY OFFICE. I TOLD HIM OF AYUB'S DISARMINGLY BLUNT APPROACH WHICH STARTED OFF WITH "FOR CHRIST SAKE, I DIDN'T COME OVER HERE TO LOOK AT BARRACKS." BRIEFLY AYUB'S POSITION WAS AS FOLLOWS: PAKISTAN HAD THE TYPE OF MANPOWER TO MAKE ONE OF THE PINEST ARMIES IN THE WORLD. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, ILL EQUIPPED, HAVING BEEN LEFT WITH LITTLE MORE THAN SAWED OFF BRITISH PARADE PIECES. HE SAID THAT IF WE WOULD EQUIP HIS ARMY, COOPERATION BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE U.S. WOULD REACH A HEIGHT AND WARMTH HARDLY PRECEDENTED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. GHULAM MOHAMMED, THE THEN GOVERNOR GENERAL, HAD TRAVELED SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO BOSTON TO SEE HIS DOCTORS. HE CAME TO WASHINGTON TO REITERATE AND EMPHASIZE AYUB'S MESSAGE TO US, SAYING THAT THAT WAS THE REAL REASON FOR HIS TRIP TO THE STATES.

8. I TOLD BHUTTO THAT THIS HAD BEEN VERY REFRESHING TALK IN THE EARLY 50'S WHEN WE THOUGHT OUR OWN SECURITY DEPENDED UPON THE FORMATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH OUR FRIENDS. THIS CONCEPT HAD OF COURSE RUN SMACK UP AGAINST THE NEHRU BRAND OF NEUTRALITY. I HAD, OF COURSE, TAKEN THE MATTER TO MY SUPERIORS AND HAD A TALK WITH AYUB BEFORE HE LEFT. I SAID HE HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I WARNED AYUB THAT THAT PROCESS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND THAT HE



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10832 02 OF 04 152112Z

SHOULD KNOW OUR VIEW, THAT IF ANY SUCH UNDERTAKING SHOULD EVER BE MADE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MOST CAREFULLY DONE IN THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY. I, OF COURSE, HAD INDIA PRIMARILY IN MIND. I ALSO SAID THAT AS WE STUDIED THE PROBLEM IT WAS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE BE NO LEAK FROM EITHER SIDE, AND AYUB AGREED. HOWEVER, SHORTLY AFTER AYUB RETURNED TO KARACHI HE GAVE ALMOST THE WHOLE STORY TO THE NEW YORK TIMES.

9. AS HE WOULD REMEMBER, NEHRU'S REACTION WAS EMOTIONALLY EXTREME. WE WENT THROUGH A PERIOD OF ALMOST DAILY PRESS COVERAGE ON THE MATTER, PARTICULARLY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. IT WAS A PERIOD IN WHICH WE TRIED TO WEIGH WHETHER SOME ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE BETWEEN PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY, AS THIS WOULD PUT ANY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN IN A REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT, AND TEND TO VEER IT AWAY FROM THE CONCEPT OF ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN ALONE IN VIEW OF HER REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITH HER NEIGHBOR, INDIA. I SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THAT I HAD EVER FACED, AS ONE COULD NOT HELP BUT TRY TO THINK THROUGH WHAT GOING AHEAD MIGHT MEAN FOR THE FUTURE. WE WERE EXTREMELY INTERESTED AS TO WHETHER DEMOCRACY COULD IN FACT REMAIN AND WIN OUT IN INDIA IN THE LONG PULL, AND COULD NOT HELP BUT COMPARE THAT GREAT EXPERIMENT WITH WHAT SEEMED TO BE GOING ON IN MAO'S CHINA, AND WHETHER ACTION OR INACTION ON OUR PART WOULD TEND TO CHANGE THE FUTURE, AND IF SO, IN WHICH WAY. I SAID IN A WAY THE VERY EXTREMENESS OF NEHRU'S REACTION TENDED TO MAKE THE PROBLEM SOMEWHAT EASIER FOR US. AT THAT TIME ANOTHER COUNTRY IN THE SUB-CONTINENT TOLD US THAT THEY THOUGHT THE STAGE HAD BEEN REACHED WHEREIN WE WOULD BE HELPING TO ESTABLISH VIRTUAL COMPLETE INDIAN HEGEMONY OVER THE ENTIRE SUB-CONTINENT IF WE REFUSED TO GO AHEAD. THEY ALSO WARNED US THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MIGHT NOT SURVIVE UNLESS WE DID GO AHEAD. FINALLY, WITH ALL OF THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND, AND OF COURSE MANY MORE, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AMONG OUR DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED TO GO AHEAD IN A LIMITED WAY AND OUR PRESIDENT AGREED.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 950

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10832 03 OF 04 152132Z

72

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

014150

P R 151406Z DEC 73  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2494  
 INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 10832

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY ON HIS RETURN

10. I SAID IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT PERHAPS ONE OF THE SOURCES OF OCCASIONAL TROUBLE OVER THIS ISSUE THROUGHOUT THE YEARS WAS THAT THERE MIGHT NEVER HAVE REALLY BEEN A COMPLETE IDENTITY OF PURPOSE BETWEEN US. ON OUR PART WE WERE THINKING PRIMARILY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. WE HAD NO IDEA, OF COURSE, OF TRYING TO SUPPORT ANY MILITARY BUILD-UP THAT COULD STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS AS THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION, EVEN IF NOTHING ELSE, COMPLETELY RULED OUT SUCH THOUGHTS. WE SAW THE AREA, HOWEVER, AS GENERALLY SHAKY AND WITHOUT THE CONFIDENCE TO GO RAPIDLY AHEAD IN THE OVERRIDING NECESSITY OF DEVELOPMENT. WE THOUGHT MORE FIRM RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE U.S. ON THE PART OF PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY, AND SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT, COULD CREATE A PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE SO THAT NATIONS COULD MOVE FORWARD. WE HAD NOT AT THAT TIME ANY IDEA OF GOING AS FAR AS WE EVENTUALLY DID IN THE PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT. THEN THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF INDIA. AYUB TOLD US THAT WE NEED HAVE NO CONCERN THAT OUR ARMS WOULD EVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA. I SAID I WAS NOT BEING CRITICAL AS WHEN THE CHIPS WERE



# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10832 03 OF 04 152132Z

DOWN A NATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY USE EVERYTHING IT HAD AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNPRACTICAL FOR US TO HAVE THOUGHT OTHERWISE. AYUB, WITH ALL HIS CANDOR, SAID, "YOU AMERICANS ARE ALWAYS TALKING ABOUT NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH WITH THE SOVIETS--WHAT IS WRONG WITH SOME OF THE REST OF US FEELING THE SAME WAY IN OUR OWN NEGOTIATIONS." I SAID THAT WAS ALL PERFECTLY LOGICAL PROVIDING ONE ASSUMED FIGHTING WOULD NOT BREAK OUT. OUR ESTIMATE ON THIS WAS THAT, WHILE THE PAKISTANIS AND THE INDIANS WOULD CONTINUE FOR A LONG, LONG TIME TO HAVE GREAT PROBLEMS, THEY WOULD NOT IN FACT LEAD TO HOSTILITIES. HISTORY PROVED OUR ESTIMATE TO BE WRONG.

11. HE SAID HE WAS FASCINATED BY WHAT I HAD SAID AS HE HAS NEVER TALKED TO ANYONE THAT HAD BEEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED. AFTER DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ABOVE, WE AGREED THAT WE WERE BACK TO TODAY, AND THE CURRENT PROBLEM. HE SAID TODAY'S PROBLEM WAS VASTLY COMPLICATED BY WHAT WAS GOING ON IN AFGHANISTAN, REFERRING ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO THE FACT THAT THEIR INFORMATION INDICATED THAT ABOUT FOUR DIVISIONS WORTH OF EQUIPMENT WOULD FLOW INTO AFGHANISTAN AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SOVIET MILITARY MISSION VISIT THERE. HE SAID IF THIS REPORT IS TRUE A WHOLE NEW DIMENSION HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM, AS LARGE AMOUNTS OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT ON BOTH SIDES OF PAKISTAN, COUPLED WITH INDIAN INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY, COULD MAKE THINGS NEARLY INTOLERABLE UNLESS PAKISTAN RECEIVED ASSISTANCE. WE TALKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AT SOME LENGTH AND OF HIS OWN FEELINGS THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAD TO GET ALONG WITH EACH OTHER, IN SPITE OF DOUBTS AND THE APPARENT UTTER FIXATION OF DAUD ON THE PUKHTUNISTAN PROBLEM. I WAS ENCOURAGED BY HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN WHICH SEEMED CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN THAT OF AYUB WHOSE INSTINCTS WERE TO "GIVE THEM THE BACK OF THE HAND" TREATMENT. HE TALKED SENSIBLY AND IN SOMEWHAT HISTORICAL TERMS AS TO WHY THEY SHOULD GET ALONG. HE SAID THAT WHEN AYUB ASKED HIM TO JOIN HIS GOVERNMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER, HE HAD ONLY DONE SO ON THE CONDITION THAT AYUB WOULD ALLOW HIM A

*Department of State***TELEGRAM****SECRET**

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10832 03 OF 04 152132Z

SUFFICIENTLY FREE HAND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND GET THE BORDER OPENED UP AGAIN. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THEY COULD LIVE WITH DAUD'S FEELING THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO A PARTIAL HAND OVER WHAT HAPPENS INSIDE PAKISTAN IN THE FRONTIER AREAS AS LONG AS AFGHANISTAN DID NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT IT. IF RUSSIAN SUPPLIES WERE TO BE OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE, HOWEVER, THAT WOULD MAKE IT A WHOLE NEW BALL GAME. HE ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN. I TOLD HIM WE HAD ONE DISTURBING REPORT BUT CAUTIONED HIM STRONGLY THAT IT WAS UNCONFIRMED. I SAID THE REPORT WAS THAT SOMETHING LIKE OVER 800 TANKS WERE EN ROUTE BUT THAT WASHINGTON, WITH ITS SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, WAS AT PRESENT DUBIOUS THAT THERE COULD BE THAT MANY AND FURTHERMORE HELD THE VIEW THAT A PART OF A NEW TANK SUPPLY WOULD BE FOR REPLACEMENT PURPOSES. HE RAISED HIS EYEBROWS SIGNIFICANTLY AND I AGAIN TOLD HIM HE SHOULD NOT GIVE WEIGHT TO THIS REPORT UNTIL WE HAD HAD TIME TO TRY TO CONFIRM OR DENY IT.



## Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 951

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10832 04 OF 04 152113Z

72

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

014116

P R 151406Z DEC 73  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2498  
 INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 CINCPAC

SECRET SECTION 4 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 10832

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY ON HIS RETURN

12. I TOLD HIM I WAS QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE GENERAL NATURE OF CURRENT PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS, CAUTIONING HIM THAT IT MIGHT BE A SITUATION WHERE MISCALCULATION COULD ARISE. IT SEEMED TO AN OUTSIDER THAT WE WERE IN A POSITION WHERE HE, AND TO AN EXTENT

THE SHAH, WERE WORRIED ABOUT DAUD'S INTENTIONS AND WE COULDN'T BE SURE OF COURSE THAT DAUD WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS. I URGED UPON HIM TO DO ALL HE COULD FOR IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, SAYING THAT IT APPEARED TO ME AS A NEWCOMER THAT AMBASSADORIAL LIAISON WAS NOT VERY EFFECTIVE. I SAID WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS IN DAUD'S MIND, BUT SAID IT WOULD BE BAD INDEED, FOR INSTANCE, IF DAUD HAPPENED TO THINK THAT HE (BHUTTO) MIGHT NOT STOP AT THE BORDER IN HIS FORWARD MOVES IN THE PROVINCES. BHUTTO SAID I NEED HAVE NO WORRY ON THAT SCORE, EMPHATICALLY SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE THE HEIGHT OF FOLLY ON THE PART OF PAKISTAN. I SAID I WAS SURE HE WOULD FEEL THAT WAY BUT WAS ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE MISCALCULATION



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10832 04 OF 04 152113Z

THROUGH LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS, HE SEEMED TO TAKE THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION QUITE SERIOUSLY AND SEEMED RATHER RELUCTANT TO LEAVE THE SUBJECT AS WE TURNED TO OTHER MATTERS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

13. AT ONE POINT I SAID I KNEW I WAS ASKING A VERY HARD QUESTION TO ANSWER, BUT COULD HE GIVE ME SOME IDEA OF HIS OWN THINKING ON WHAT KIND OF AN ARMS RATIO WITH INDIA WOULD BE LIVEABLE. HE SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT INDEED AS FORMULAS SUCH AS 1/3, 1/2, ETC. WERE NOT VERY MEANINGFUL UNLESS ONE GOT INTO THE QUESTION OF "QUALITY" OF WEAPONS. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION OF FACT THAT THE MOST IDEAL ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM WAS THROUGH CONTINUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA DURING WHICH I MADE THE SAME REMARKS AS I DID TO AZIZ AHMED, AS PER ABOVE REFTEL. THIS LED TO WHAT WAS FOR ME THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF OUR DISCUSSION. I ASKED IF HE HAD EVER THOUGHT THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE, IF PAKISTAN-INDIAN RELATIONS CAN CONTINUE TO IMPROVE, TO TRY TO REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH THE INDIANS ON A GENERAL LEVEL OF ARMS. HE SAID HE HAD INDEED, AND MADE REFERENCE TO HIS OWN STATEMENTS TO THAT EFFECT. HE SAID HE REGRETTED THAT INDIA DID NOT SEEM TO BE INTERESTED, AND THAT THE IDEA HAD EVEN BEEN PUBLICLY BRISHED ASIDE BY SWARAN SINGH. HE SAID HE STILL THOUGHT THIS WAS A GOOD APPROACH AND DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON IT. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR PROBLEM QUITE WELL AND WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO FIND ANY FORMULA THAT WOULD MAKE MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN LESS DIFFICULT FOR US. HE SAID HE REALLY REGRETTED HAVING A PROBLEM SO DIFFICULT FOR OUR PRESIDENT AND KISSINGER. HE SAID IF THE RIGHT QUALITY WEAPONS COULD BE OBTAINED HE WAS WILLING TO PARALLEL OUR ACTION BY ANY CONCEIVABLE ACTION OF HIS OWN THAT MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER, REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO AN ANNOUNCED REDUCTION OF HIS TOTAL FORCE LEVEL, PUBLIC PLEDGES TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THROUGH PEACEFUL DISCUSSION WITH NEIGHBORING STATES, ETC., ETC. I TOLD HIM THAT HIS REMARKS WERE HIGHLY INTERESTING TO ME, AND ASKED IF HE HAD EVER TALKED ALONG THIS LINE

*Department of State***TELEGRAM****SECRET**

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10832 04 OF 04 152113Z

WITH THE SECRETARY. HE SAID HE HAD NOT REALLY, AS THERE HAD NEVER BEEN TIME.

14. IT WAS A GOOD TALK AND I BELIEVE OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE OFF TO A GOOD START. HE FOUND ME SYMPATHETIC, AND CONCERNED, BUT IN THE POSTURE OF NOT KNOWING JUST WHAT WE COULD DO, OR INDEED SHOULD DO. WE AGREED THAT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE AREA WAS A VERY LARGE FACTOR AFFECTING WHAT EITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DO, AND THAT OUR ESTIMATES MIGHT NOT BE QUITE THE SAME AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY THE FIRST OF MANY MESSAGES AS THE SUBJECT MATTER CAN OBVIOUSLY NOT BE AVOIDED HERE, NOR INDEED SHOULD IT BE. THE ONLY THING I CAN PROMISE JUST NOW IS THAT FUTURE MESSAGES WILL NOT BE THIS LONG.

15. BHUTTO INVITED MRS. BYROADE AND ME TO A VISIT WITH THEM AT HIS COUNTRY ESTATE NEAR LARKANA SOMETIME IN EARLY JANUARY WHEN HE GOES THERE FOR A SHORT VACATION. HE ASKED IF I LIKED SHOOTING AND I TOLD HIM I WAS REALLY PRETTY DAMNED GOOD WITH A RIFLE, BUT IMPOSSIBLY LOUSY WITH A SHOT GUN, AND THOUGHT THE THING SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN INVENTED. HE LAUGHED AND SAID WE WOULD GIVE IT A TRY AND FIND OUT.  
BYROADE

**SECRET**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 124

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10803 01 OF 02 141257Z

43

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 AID-20 MC-02 EB-11 TRSE-00

COME-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 EA-11 /194 W

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001126

P 140615Z DEC 73  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2480  
 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY  
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
 CINCPAC  
 AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10803

E.O. 11652: GDS  
 TAGS: PFOR, MASS, PK, US  
 SUBJECT: AZIZ AHMED ON US ARMS POLICY

1. MY CALLS ON HIGH PAK OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE IT IS RULE OF PROTOCOL HERE THAT THE FIRST CALL BE UPON AZIZ AHMED. HE HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY WITH BHUTTO, RETURNING HERE NIGHT BEFORE LAST. HE ASKED THAT I CALL ON HIM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

2. AFTER QUITE SHORT CHIT-CHAT, AS I HAD KNOWN HIM WHEN HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. HE ABRUPTLY LAUNCHED INTO A DISCUSSION OF OUR ARMS POLICY IN THE SUB-CONTINENT. I HAD KNOW THIS PROBLEM WOULD ARISE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT I WOULD VERY EARLY ON BE PUT TO A TEST ON THIS ISSUE, BUT HAD NOT KNOWN HE WOULD BE AFFORDED SUCH A CONVENIENT OPENING GAMBIT. AN ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE PRESS HERE YESTERDAY MORNING DATED LINED WASHINGTON, SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
 HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
 HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
 JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
 KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
 NEGRO PONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
 ODUM \_\_\_\_\_  
 RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RONCON \_\_\_\_\_  
 SANDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SOMMERFELD \_\_\_\_\_  
 V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
 WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET



# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10803 01 OF 02 141257Z

HAD AGREED TO RESUME BUILDING THE "PEACE INDIGO" MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR INDIA, CANCELLED DURING THE DECEMBER 1971 WAR, QUOTING AMERICAN MILITARY AND INDIAN EMBASSY SOURCES IN WASHINGTON. THE ARTICLE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE PROJECT AND HAD THE CURIOUS SENTENCE "THE UNITED STATES HAS SINCE LIFTED THE EMBARGO ON ARMS TO PAKISTAN". (AZID AHMED DID NOT MENTION THIS SENTENCE AND WE BELIEVE IT IS JUST BAD REPORTING OR POSSIBLY TYPO ERROR, AND HOPE IT WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH AND DOES NOT START NEW PRESS SPECULATION.)

3. AZIZ AHMED SAID THAT BHUTTO HAD ASKED HIM TO TAKE THIS UP WITH ME IMMEDIATELY AS THEY VIEWED IT QUITE SERIOUSLY AND WERE SURPRISED NOT TO BE INFORMED BEFORE HEARING ABOUT IT IN THE PRESS. I TOLD HIM QUITE FRANKLY I HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE PROJECT UNTIL I SAW IT IN THE PRESS THIS MORNING AND HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE MY STAFF ON THIS PRIOR TO MEETING WITH HIM, BUT THAT I WOULD GET UP-TO-DATE ON THE BACKGROUND IMMEDIATELY. HE THEN SHOWED ME THE CONTENTS OF A NOTE THAT WE HAD SOME TIME AGO SENT THEM DESCRIBING THIS PROJECT AND SAYING IT WOULD NOT BE RESUMED AS LONG AS WE HAD A POLICY OF TOTAL EMBARGO. I SAID I THEREFORE ASSUMED WE FELT THIS PROJECT WAS PRIMARILY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, AND THAT IT WOULD LOGICALLY BE RESUMED WITH OUR RECENT PARTIAL LIFT OF THE EMBARGO. AZIZ AHMED ADMITTED THAT OUR NOTE POINTED OUT THAT ONLY ONE OF THE SIX FIXED RADAR STATIONS INVOLVED COULD BE EFFECTIVE OVER PAKISTAN TERRITORY, BUT SAID THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT TWO MOBILE UNITS IN THE AREA OF KASHMIR WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TIED INTO THE LINK WE WERE CONSTRUCTING. I TOLD HIM I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT ALL THIS BEFORE WE COULD USEFULLY DISCUSS IT. HE AGAIN MADE QUITE A POINT ABOUT NOT KNOWING ABOUT THIS IN ADVANCE.

4. (COMMENT: WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE OFFICE I CHECKED THE FILES AND FOUND WE HAD BRIEFED AZIZ AHMED PRETTY THOROUGHLY ON "PEACE INDIGO" IN DECEMBER 1972 (STATE 221211 AND ISLAMABAD 9714 AND 9934 OF 1972). WE TOLD HIM AT THAT TIME THAT THE PROJECT WAS BLOCKED AS LONG AS WE

SECRET



# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10803 01 OF 02 141257Z

KEPT THE TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO ON THE SUB-CONTINENT, BUT WHEN HE SAID HE HAD TO ASSUME IT WOULD BE TAKEN UP AGAIN ONCE THE EMBARGO WAS LIFTED, WE AGREED IT WAS A GOOD ASSUMPTION.)

5. THE ABOVE QUITE NICELY GAVE AZIZ AHMED AN OPENING TO LAUNCH INTO DISCUSSIONS ABOUT OUR CURRENT ARMS POLICY IN GENERAL, SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE AREA, INDIA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY, IWER MILITARY BUDGET, HER INDIGENOUS ABILITY TO PRODUCE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, DEPLOYMENT OF INDIAN FORCES, AND OF COURSE, SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA. THERE WAS NOTHING REALLY NEW IN THIS PRESENTATION AND HAVE DECIDED NOT TO LENGTHEN THIS PARTICULAR CABLE BY SUMMARIZING IT. ALSO, AZIZ AHMED TOLD ME THAT HE KNEW BHUTTO WOULD WANT TO PERSONALLY SPEND QUITE A BIT OF TIME WITH ME ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT, AND HE PREDICTED THAT IT WOULD BE JUST AS SOON AS THE PRIME MINISTER COULD DO SO, POSSIBLY IN DAY OR SO. (IT MAY BE BEST THAT I AWAIT A COMPLETE ANALYSIS FOR THE DEPARTMENT, ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THIS WILL MERELY BE AN UPDATING OF WHAT IS GENERALLY KNOWN.)

6. I ASKED AZIZ AHMED TO TALK FULLY ABOUT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS PROBLEM, SAYING THAT WHILE I WAS QUITE FAMILIAR WITH IT, I WANTED TO HEAR ABOUT IT FROM HIM. HIS GENERAL PITCH WAS THAT IT WAS THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS AN "OPEN QUESTION" AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED. HE TOOK THE STANCE, THEREFORE, THAT THEY WERE WAITING FOR US TO MAKE UP OUR MIND AND GIVE THEM THE ANSWER, HOPING OF COURSE IT COULD BE AFFIRMATIVE AND SOON.

SECRET



# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 122

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10803 02 OF 02 141248Z

43

-ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 AID-20 MC-02 EB-11 TRSE-00

COME-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 EA-11 /194 W

001080

P 140615Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2481

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

CINCPAC

AMEMBASSY KABUL

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10803

7. I REVIEWED SOMEWHAT THE DILEMMA THAT THIS PROBLEM GIVES US. I SAID I COULD, I THOUGHT, REFUTE SOME OF HIS POINTS BUT WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DO SO AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH I HOPED THAT SOON HE COULD FIND THE TIME FOR A REALLY LONG TALK ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. I SAID THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE LOGIC IN SOME OF HIS POINTS, AS I DID NOT WANT TO ATTEMPT FUTILE ARGUMENTATION ON THOSE WHERE THEY DO IN FACT HAVE LOGIC ON THEIR SIDE.

8. BUT I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD STRUGGLED WITH THIS PROBLEM OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, INDEED FROM THE TIME OF THE DECISION TO FIRST ASSIST PAKISTAN MILITARILY WHEN I HAD JOE SISCO'S JOB. I SAID SOMETIMES I WAS NOT SURE I WAS WISE ENOUGH TO KNOW THE BEST ANSWER. I THOUGHT, HOWEVER, ON THING WAS QUITE CLEAR, AND THAT WAS THAT THE "BEST" ANSWER COULD ONLY BE FOUND IN A CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN PAKISTAN-INDIAN RELATIONS A LA SIMLA, AND BEYOND. I SAID THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA, WHICH SEEMED TO BE HOPEFULLY, BUT QUITE SLOWLY,

SECRET



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10803 02 OF 02 141248Z

-IMPROVING, WERE OF COURSE IMPORTANT TO US, BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THIS WAS BY NO MEANS ALL THAT WAS AT STAKE. IF WE TOOK A COURSE ON THIS ISSUE WHICH RADICALLY WORSENERED OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA, IT SEEMED TO ME ALMOST AXIOMATIC THAT AS A BACK-LASH PAKISTAN-INDIAN RELATIONS COULD IN THEMSELVES BECOME RADICALLY WORSE. AZIZ AHMED RELUCTANTLY AGREED THAT THIS COULD POSSIBLY TURN OUT TO BE THE CASE. I SAID CERTAINLY THE MOST DISASTROUS THING THAT COULD BE DONE IN THE AREA WOULD BE TO SEE ADDED SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT TO INDIA AND MATCHING SUPPORT ON OUR PART TO PAKISTAN BUILD UP INTO A LOCAL ARMS RACE. HE ALSO SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS WAS CORRECT, AND SUPPORTED MY VIEW AS TO WHAT THIS WOULD DO TO MUCH NEEDED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, HE VOICED A DOUBT THAT INDIA WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR RELATIONS TO IMPROVE AS RAPIDLY AND TO THE EXTENT WE HOPED, PARTICULARLY WITH THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE.

9. I DID, HOWEVER, GIVE HIM A SYMPATHETIC HEARING, WHILE IN NO WAY IMPLYING THAT I WOULD RECOMMEND ANY CHANGE IN PRESENT POLICY WHICH HE WOULD UNDERSTAND IN ANY EVEN IN VIEW OF MY NEWNESS HERE. HE CAN BE QUITE A HARDLINER, AS READERS OF THIS MESSAGE WELL KNOW, BUT HE KEPT THINGS SOFT AND PLEASANT, PROBABLY IN PART BECAUSE THIS WAS OUR FIRST SERIOUS DISCUSSION AND HE KNEW I WOULD GET A REPEAT FROM BHUTTO.

10. I HAVE CALLED ON SIX AMBASSADORS SO FAR, AND FIVE OF THEM (SOVIETS THE EXCEPTION) RAISED THIS SUBJECT AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE SAYING THAT THEY FELT LIFE WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME HERE OVER THE ARMS SUPPLY ISSUE. SURPRISINGLY, THE JAPANESE (A SERIOUS INTELLECTUAL TYPE) WAS THE MOST EMPHATIC. THE EGYPTIAN, WHO HAS BEEN HERE FIVE YEARS, WAS ALSO EMPHATIC, SURPRISING ME IN A RATHER DETAILED ACCOUNT AS TO HOW MUCH THIS TOPIC WAS A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IN THE STREETS AND BAZAARS. THE IRANIAN ECHOED THE SENTIMENTS OF THE SHAH.

11. EVEN THE KNOWLEDGEABLE BRITISH AMBASSADOR SAID

SECRET



# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10803 02 OF 02 141248Z

THAT IN THEIR MODEST WAY THE BRITISH HAD MADE SOME EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO PAKISTAN AND THAT HE ANTICIPATED FURTHER LOOSENING OF THEIR OWN POLICY IN THE COMING YEAR, AS HE HAD FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE LONDON THAT THE TIME HAD COME NOT TO PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO OVER-REACTION IN DELHI. HE STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THINGS WOULD TURN OUT BEST IF WE COULD MOVE SOMEWHAT FURTHER FORWARD OURSELVES.

12. I TOLD HIM THAT SOME OF THE LOGIC OF THE INDIAN REACTION ESCAPED ME. THE INDIANS DIDN'T SEEM TO RAISE MUCH FUSS IF THE FRENCH OR OTHERS AIDED PAKISTAN MILITARILY, BUT THEY WENT COMPLETELY EMOTIONAL OVER ANY EFFORT WE MIGHT MAKE. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A VERY SIMPLE ANSWER: THE INDIANS KNEW THAT FRANCE WAS INTERESTED IN THIS GAME FOR PRIMARILY COMMERCIAL REASONS, AND THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO THEIR OBJECTIONS, SO WHY TRY. HE SAID THE INDIANS FELT MORE SURELY THAT THEY COULD INFLUENCE THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S., PARTICULARLY OF OUR CONGRESS SO THEY KEPT THE EMOTIONAL ISSUE ALIVE PRIMARILY WITH US.

13. SO FAR I HAVE ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO OTHER AMBASSADORS MY AWARENESS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM, AND OF OUR HOPE THAT THE BEST SECURITY FOR THE AREA MIGHT COME THROUGH INCREASINGLY GOOD PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS. I CONTINUE, OF COURSE, TO HAVE A FERVENT HOPE THAT AN ENTIRELY NEW ELEMENT IS NOT INJECTED INTO THIS PROBLEM ALONG THE LINES OF RECENT REPORTS FROM KABUL.  
BYROADE

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